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Abstract 
 
Members of the field of philosophy have, just as other people, political convictions or, as 
psychologists call them, ideologies. How are different ideologies distributed and perceived in 
the field? Using the familiar distinction between the political left and right, we surveyed an 
international sample of 794 subjects in philosophy. We found that survey participants clearly 
leaned left (75%), while right-leaning individuals (14%) and moderates (11%) were 
underrepresented. Moreover, and strikingly, across the political spectrum, from very left-
leaning individuals and moderates to very right-leaning individuals, participants reported 
experiencing ideological hostility in the field, occasionally even from those from their own 
side of the political spectrum. Finally, while about half of the subjects believed that 
discrimination against left- or right-leaning individuals in the field is not justified, a 
significant minority displayed an explicit willingness to discriminate against colleagues with 
the opposite ideology. Our findings are both surprising and important, because a 
commitment to tolerance and equality is widespread in philosophy, and there is reason to 
think that ideological similarity, hostility, and discrimination undermine reliable belief 
formation in many areas of the discipline.  
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Introduction 
 
“[W]hen I look upon my own discipline, the discipline of philosophy,  
I find egregious effects of ideology […].” 
(J. Stanley 2015: xvi) 
 
One of the most interesting and salient properties that individuate subjects and groups is their 
political conviction or ideology,6 that is, their being, for instance, liberal, conservative, socialist, 
feminist, anarchist, etc. (Jost et al. 2009). Determining whether subjects “are engines of change or 
preservers of the status quo”, and so identifying their ideology, has in fact been found to be one of 
the “fundamental dimensions on which people spontaneously distinguish social groups” (Koch et al. 
2016: 702).  
 
It is a dimension of social identity that, in the wake of recent dramatic changes in politics 
throughout the world (e.g., Trump’s US presidency, Brexit, and the rise of populist parties) is 
becoming increasingly more the target and source of bias and hostility between people (Maher et al. 
2018; Iyengar and Massey 2019). Studies found, for instance, that bias and hostility against 
ideological opponents is now more pronounced than that tied to gender, race, religious, linguistic, 
or regional out-groups (Westwood and Iyengar 2015; Westwood et al. 2018). 
 
Importantly, ideological bias and hostility might also leak into academic disciplines and contribute 
to a decrease in viewpoint diversity in them, leading to detrimental epistemic outcomes (Longino 
2002: 132; Jussim et al. 2018; Peters 2019). Indeed, studies already found that certain ideological 
groups are faced with overt or covert biases and discrimination in, for instance, the social sciences 
(Yancey 2011; Inbar and Lammers 2012; Honeycutt and Freberg 2017).7 
 
What do we know about the representation of different political viewpoints, and ideological biases 
against them among members of the field of philosophy (henceforth ‘philosophers’),8 in particular? 
While there has been much discussion in philosophy about diversity and bias against various 
underrepresented groups in the field (Botts et al. 2014; Brownstein and Saul 2016; Allen-
Hermanson 2017a; Kings 2019), there is no systematic and inclusive study pertaining to the 
distribution of and possible bias against ideologies in the field. As Schwitzgebel and Hassoun (2018) 
																																																								
6 While the term ‘ideology’ is often used in an evaluative sense imputing to a system of beliefs some negative 
characteristic(s), we use it in a non-evaluative way as referring simply to political convictions, i.e., political “beliefs 
about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” (Erikson and Tedin 2003: 64). This neutral notion is 
prevalent in social psychology and political science (Jost et al. 2009). 
7 Neither here nor in these studies is it assumed that the underrepresentation at issue is caused solely or mostly by bias. 
The causal connections are complex: self-selection and other factors might be the main reasons for a group’s 
underrepresentation. But if there is a bias against a group then it is not unreasonable to assume that it is likely to 
contribute to that underrepresentation. 
8 Members of the field of philosophy, and so philosophers for us here, include faculty, researchers, and students. 
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note, “political viewpoint” is one of the most “under-studied dimensions of diversity [in 
philosophy]”.9  
 
This gap in the research is unfortunate. For there are philosophers with different ideologies, ranging 
from the political left to the right, who claim their political viewpoints are underrepresented and 
subject to “ideological bias” and discrimination in the field (Haslanger 2008: 216; Saul 2015; Kings 
2019: 214f, 225f; Case 2015; Sesardic 2016). These claims warrant a careful empirical assessment. 
After all, philosophers and philosophical institutions often emphasize the “imperative of 
philosophizing to strive for an open community into which all are welcome,”10 explicitly condemn 
discrimination based on “political convictions” as “unethical”,11 and define philosophy as “unbridled 
criticism” (Priest 2006: 207). Such statements of openness, tolerance, and free criticism are clearly 
tension with ideological biases and discrimination. They beg the question as to whether the field of 
philosophy is indeed also, just as, for instance, the social sciences (Yancey 2011; Honeycutt and 
Freberg 2017), affected by these ideology-related phenomena, or not. 
  
The question is especially important when it comes to the field of philosophy. For scientific claims 
can usually be experimentally tested, but philosophical claims frequently can’t, or simply aren’t. 
For instance, in ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of science, or philosophy of religion claims 
are often value-laden and admit no straightforward empirical check: whether abortion is murder, 
economic equality just, verificationism tenable, or the theodicy problem disproof of God can’t be 
settled experimentally. Some philosophical research can be experimentally assessed (Knobe and 
Nichols 2017), but much is accepted on the basis of intuitions and “subtle appeals to plausibility”, 
which are particularly susceptible to influences of values and biases (Kornblith 1999: 185). To 
protect themselves from blind spots and errors in their reasoning, philosophers rely thus much 
more than scientists on social criticism. Since a lack of ideological diversity and ideological biases 
reduce the scope of social criticism, they threaten the reliability of philosophical belief formation 
(Peters 2019). 
 
We, a politically diverse team of philosophers and social psychologists, therefore conducted a 
systematic international survey pertaining to ideological diversity and bias in philosophy. Before 
turning to the details and results of the survey, we will provide a brief overview of the existing 
work on the issue.  
 
But first, a final terminological clarification: While the terms ‘bias’, ‘hostility’, and ‘discrimination’ 
have negative moral connotations related to the idea of unfairness, we shall use these expressions 
more neutrally in that we grant that some ideological biases, hostility, and discrimination might be 
epistemically and/or ethically beneficial and justified (Antony 2016; Fantl 2018: 177f). Whether or 																																																								
9 https://blog.apaonline.org/2018/03/26/tell-us-how-to-fix-the-lack-of-diversity-in-philosophy-journals/ 
10 See https://philosophy.stanford.edu/about/diversity-and-climate 
11 https://www.apaonline.org/page/nondiscrimination 
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not that is so needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.12 Our focus here is primarily on exploring 
the reality of ideological biases, hostility, and discrimination in philosophy. We do, however, 
believe and briefly argue below (section 6) that these phenomena are also often both epistemically 
and ethically costly enough to consider counteracting them. 
 
1. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
Studies that provide insights into the distribution of and possible bias against ideologies in 
philosophy are rare. Moreover, most of the existing ones were conducted only with US samples, 
and focus mainly on liberals and conservatives, or Democrats and Republicans.  
 
1.1 Data on the distribution of ideologies in philosophy 
 
There are three different kinds of relevant studies. Rothman and Lichter (2009) report findings 
from the North American Academic Study Survey (NAASS), noting that among philosophy 
professors (N=26), 79% self-identified as liberals and 4% as conservatives. Relying instead on 
public voting records of professors in a number of US states, Schwitzgebel (2008) found that among 
philosophers (N=375), 87.2% were Democrat, 7.7% Republican, 2.7% Green, 1.3% 
Independent, 0.8% Libertarian, and 0.3% Peace & Freedom. Similarly, Klein and Stern (2009) 
report three US voter-registration studies finding a 5:1, 9:1, and 24:1 Democrat to Republican 
ratio among philosophers. Other relevant data come from Bourget and Chalmers (2014), who sent 
a survey to 1,972 philosophy faculty members at 99 institutions in Anglophone countries, 
questioning them about 30 philosophical topics. One was related to politics asking respondents 
whether they favored egalitarianism, communitarianism, libertarianism, or another position not 
specified. From 931 respondents, 34.8% favored egalitarianism, 14.3% communitarianism, 9.9% 
libertarianism, and 41.0% other, unspecified positions.  
 
To our knowledge, these three kinds of studies are all that are currently available on the 
distribution of ideologies in philosophy. Even less is known about the existence and frequency of 
ideological bias in the field. 
 
1.2 Data on ideological bias in philosophy 
 
Two surveys provide relevant data. Using the liberal/conservative distinction, Honeycutt and 
Freberg (2017) polled 618 academics from various disciplines, including philosophy, across four 
Californian universities. They found an overt bias against both conservatives among liberals and 
against liberals among conservatives in, for instance, the assessment of grant applications, the 																																																								
12 Since using ‘bias’, ‘hostility’ or ‘discrimination’ when it comes to aversive responding to, say, racists or Nazis might 
come problematically close to expressing sympathy with such individuals (and may amount to what Saul (2017) calls 
using “fig leaves”), we wish to explicitly allow for some positive, justified instances of ideological bias, hostility, and 
discrimination (the case just mentioned being one of them).   
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review of papers, and hiring decisions. Their data analysis doesn’t allow for specific conclusions 
about the field of philosophy, however. Yancey (2011) conducted a study that does. He surveyed 
160 US philosophers on whether being a Democrat or a Republican damages acceptance of job 
applicants. Specifically, participants had to rate their own attitude on a 7-point scale in which 1 
indicated that the characteristic at issue would “greatly damage” the participant’s own “support to 
hire” an applicant and 7 indicated that the characteristic would “greatly enhance” it (Yancey 2011: 
220).13 Yancey found a mean score of 4.248 for Democrats and a mean score of 3.699 for 
Republicans (2011: 117, 188). Since scoring below the 4.0 mid-point indicated that participants 
were overall more likely to reject than to accept applicants solely on the basis of their ideology, the 
data suggest the presence of a bias against Republicans in the sample.  
 
As far as we know, these two studies provide all of the existing professionally gathered and 
published quantitative data on ideological bias, hostility, and discrimination in philosophy. But 
there are other relevant findings. 
 
1.3 Informally gathered data and anecdotes 
 
Weinberg (2016) used his website Daily Nous to ask people working in philosophy “[w]hich ideas 
are students protected from?” and “[w]hich are faculty fearful to defend?”14 He reports that from 
132 responses, “several of the more popular answers on the list” of “ideas faculty are too scared to 
defend” were “critiques of feminism, critiques of homosexuality, critiques of race- and gender-
based affirmative action, importance of racial differences in IQ and behaviour for social programs, 
critiques of transgender ‘ideology’”.15 These ideas are often considered conservative.  
 
There is also anecdotal evidence of ideological bias.16 Conservative philosophers have reported fear 
to express their viewpoints in the field (Shield and Dunn 2016: 104, 123), and claimed they are 
often ridiculed (Sesardic 2016: 200), or told that their “ideas and sentiments are reactionary, 
prejudiced, sexist or racist” (Scruton 2014: 12). Similarly, left-leaning philosophers have held that 
there is, for instance, not only an anti-female but also an “antifeminist bias in philosophy” 
(Haslanger 2008: 216; see also Saul 2013: 43f, 2015, Kings 2019: 225f). The matter clearly calls 
for more research.  
 																																																								
13 Many thanks to Lawrence Lengbeyer for prompting us to be clearer about the details of the study. The clarification 
that Yancey’s participants were asked about their own support for the job applicant should also have been added to 
Peters (2019: 400). 
14 http://dailynous.com/2016/08/30/ideas-students-protected-from-faculty-fearful-to-defend/ 
15 http://dailynous.com/2016/09/06/ideas-faculty-scared-defend-follow/ 
16 Student protests against certain invited speakers or lecturers might also suggest some (possibly not discipline-specific) 
ideological hostility. For an incident involving Peter Singer at the University of Victoria (Canada), see 
http://www.martlet.ca/protesters-crash-effective-altruism-debate/; for a recent case involving Jeff McMahan (and a 
critical discussion of ‘no-platforming’), see McMahan (2019); for an incident involving philosophy classes on abortion, 
see http://dailynous.com/2017/03/31/university-suspends-philosopher-lesson-abortion/ 
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2. THE SURVEY 
 
To assess the distribution of and possible bias against political viewpoints in philosophy, we 
surveyed an international sample of philosophers, contacting them per email via the ‘Liverpool List’ 
aka ‘PHILOS-L’. PHILOS-L is the “largest Philosophy email list in the world with currently 10896 
members in over 60 countries”.17 Given the international and diverse nature of the subjects on the 
list, the recruitment of our sample called for a particular conceptualization of participants’ political 
identity.  
 
2.1 Key concepts  
 
There are different concepts that might be used to track the ideology of participants in a survey. In 
related studies in fields other than philosophy, researchers relied on respondents’ self-identification 
in terms of the liberal vs. conservative distinction (Inbar and Lammers 2012; Honeycutt and 
Freberg 2017). The liberal vs. conservative distinction has, however, significantly different 
meanings internationally and is (just as the Democrat vs. Republican distinction) less familiar in 
cross-national contexts (Goldfarb 2010; Carl 2015). We thus refrained from using it. We reasoned 
instead that the more units (e.g., people) a comparison involves and the greater the range of 
settings in which they are found (e.g., countries), the more abstract the concepts employed in the 
comparison will need to be so as to be able to form interesting generalizations. Political scientists 
have noted that largely because of this point, the well known political “left-right orientations, and 
the search for placements along a left-right dimension, have proved such an enduring element in 
comparative political analysis” (Mair 2009: 207). To be sure, there is no unanimously accepted 
definition of the political left vs. right, but the left-right spectrum is internationally widely 
understood in the way depicted in Figure 1 (Heywood 2015: 119).  
 
 
            Progressive   vs.    Traditional 
 
 
   Communism          Socialism               Liberalism                     Conservatism                       Fascism 
 
Figure 1. Linear left-right spectrum 
 
 
While it remains a simplification of political reality, the left-right distinction is “ubiquitous [in 
politics, and in] public opinion surveys all over the world, [and] self-placement on a left–right scale 
[…] consistently proves to be one of the best predictors of a person’s political attitudes and 																																																								
17 https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/philosophy/philos-l/ 
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behavior” (Noel and Therien 2008: 10). There is also an overlap internationally when it comes to 
key components of the meaning of the dichotomy (Bobbio 1996; Lukes 2003). Studies suggest that 
all “around the world [there is a] recurrent association between the left, egalitarianism and state 
intervention [to regulate the economy]. By contrast, the right is invariably identified with market 
liberalization and lesser state intervention [in the economy]” (Rosas and Ferreira 2014: 9; Rockey 
2014; Cochrane 2015). Relatedly, a 2018 study focusing on eight countries (Australia, Chile, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, UK, and the US) found that despite the different national histories, 
left and right “still summarize and mediate the influence that personality features like basic values 
and core political values may exert on political choices”, and “refer to similar patterns of values and 
principles across political contexts”, making the “left/right ideology […] worthy of careful 
consideration […] for scholars to address, predict, and compare political preferences across 
countries” (Caprara and Vecchione 2018: 70, 79). We too thus decided to use self-identification on 
the left-right spectrum to track political viewpoints.  
 
Notice that one might, for instance, be left-leaning on social issues in that one favors personal 
freedom, equality, social justice, etc., but right-leaning on economic issues in that one favors 
economic freedom, accepts economic inequalities, competitive capitalism, etc. (Crawford et al. 
2016: 385). The reverse might hold too. To capture these differences, we asked participants not 
only about their overall left-right self-identification but also about how they would see themselves 
on the left-right spectrum when it comes to social and economic issues. 
 
2.2 Main questions and hypotheses 
 
The study was structured around three main questions: (1) How are left/right ideologies 
distributed in philosophy? (2) Is there a bias, hostility, or discrimination against left/right-leaning 
individuals or viewpoints in the field? (3) If so, do members of the field take them to be justified? 
Corresponding to (1)-(3), and partly based on the results of related extant research on the 
“ideological-conflict hypothesis” (Brandt et al. 2014), which posits that people with different 
ideologies dislike ideas that conflict with their own and aim to maintain their worldview via 
motivated information processing against worldview-violating groups, we generated a set of 
hypotheses (pre-registered18 prior to data collection). Our main hypotheses19 were:  
 
(H1) Philosophers are predominantly left leaning. 
(H2) The more left-leaning the participant, the less hostility they would report experiencing, 
and, correspondingly, the more right-leaning the participant, the more hostility they would 
report experiencing. 
(H3) Left-leaning and right-leaning individuals report similar willingness to discriminate 
against each other. 																																																								
18 See our OSF platform at: https://osf.io/qd5fy/?view_only=aced37bbef6b44478c2f744920423187 
19  Nine hypotheses were pre-registered in total. For all of them and the respective findings, see 
https://osf.io/qd5fy/?view_only=aced37bbef6b44478c2f744920423187. We focus only on the four main ones here. 
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(H4) There is a significant association between ideology and justification of discrimination 
against left/right-leaning individuals, such that the more right-leaning participants would 
consider discrimination against the left to be more justified, and the more left-leaning 
participants would consider discrimination against the right to be more justified. 
 
3. METHOD 
 
We used a survey instrument adapted from Honeycutt and Freberg (2017). It included questions 
about hostility and discrimination against both left-leaning and right-leaning individuals and 
contents (i.e., arguments, claims, etc.). That is, the questions were ‘mirrored’ for ideological 
opposites.20 The instrument, which was hosted on a secure Qualtrics site, is available online on an 
OSF platform (see the link below).21 All study material received prior approval by the Social and 
Societal Ethics Committee (SMEC) at KU Leuven, and the Institutional Review Board at Rutgers 
University.  
 
3.1 Sample 
 
In June-July 2018, 1069 participants were recruited from the PHILOS-L server. 275 were 
excluded using pre-specified data exclusion criteria,22 resulting in a final sample of 794 participants 
(562 male, 213 female, 19 other/no response; age range: 18-85; average age: 37.1). 691 (87%) 
were White, 29 multiracial, 24 Asian, 17 Hispanic/Latino(a), 17 Middle-Eastern/North African, 3 
Black or African American, and 2 Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. 11 declined to state 
ethnicity. Most participants resided in Europe (67.13%; Table 1). Overall, 38% identified as 
graduate student, 28.6% as full/associate/assistant professor, 14.4% as post-doctoral researcher, 
6.7% as assistant lecturer/teaching assistant, and 5.2% as undergraduate student. 7% selected 
“other”. As for philosophical traditions, 57.7% of the participants worked in analytic philosophy, 
27.6% in continental philosophy, and 14.8% indicated “other”. For area of specialization 
(participants were able to select more than one), 36.9% mentioned “political philosophy”, 35.3% 
“ethics”, 21.7% “philosophy of science”, 21.4% “history of philosophy”, 20.3% “epistemology”, 
18.4% “metaphysics”, 17.5% “philosophy of mind”, 13% “phenomenology”, 7.8% “aesthetics”, 
7.7% “philosophy of religion”, 6.9% “logic”, and 16% selected “other”. 
 
3.2 Measures 
 
We presented participants with different types of questions. The four main types were:23 
 																																																								
20 Previous surveys on political diversity in academia were criticized for only tracking participants’ responses to one 
particular ideology without also assessing responses to the opposite one (Skitka 2012). Our instrument avoids this. 
21 https://osf.io/qd5fy/?view_only=aced37bbef6b44478c2f744920423187 
22 Participants were excluded if they didn’t agree to the informed consent or answered less than 50% of the questions. 
23 For all questions, see https://osf.io/qd5fy/?view_only=aced37bbef6b44478c2f744920423187 
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(1) Questions on the distribution of ideologies  
 
Respondents were asked to indicate their own and their colleagues’24 ideology on social/ethical 
issues, economic issues, and overall, using the familiar political left-right spectrum, and 7-point 
scales (1=Very left-leaning, 4=Moderate, 7=Very right-leaning).  
(2) Questions on ideological hostility  
 
To assess participants’ own experience of ideology-related hostility in philosophy, subjects were 
asked (1) how hostile the climate in their field is toward their own political beliefs, (2) how often 
they refrain from expressing their political beliefs to colleagues for fear of negative consequences, 
and (3) how often they think colleagues would discriminate against them on the basis of their 
ideology (5-point scales were used; 1=Not at all hostile, 3=Moderately hostile, 5=Extremely hostile, 
and 1=Never, 3=Occasionally, 5=All the time). Participants were also asked to speculate about the 
hostility they believed left/right-leaning colleagues might experience due to their ideology. The 
same questions (and scales) as before were used, but with the context changed from self to others.  
 
We also added one question asking participants whether they would be reluctant to defend their 
own argument if it led to a left-leaning conclusion, and one question on whether they would be 
reluctant to do so if the argument led to a right-leaning conclusion. Our thought was that ideological 
hostility might not only emerge in relation to people but also in relation to contents, manifesting 
itself, for instance, in an aversion to support counter-ideological conclusion (claims, arguments, 
findings etc.; Stevens et al. 2018). We reasoned that a strong reluctance to defend one’s own 
arguments when they lead to counter-ideological conclusions also reflects an interesting 
asymmetric allegiance to an ideology over academic debate and constructive discourse. 
 
(3) Questions on willingness to discriminate 
 
Two sets of four questions captured what we (following others; Brandt et al. 2014) conceptualized 
as participants’ willingness to discriminate (henceforth ‘WTD’) against left/right-leaning 
individuals/contents in their field. Specifically, we asked participants how often (5-point scale; 
1=Never, 3=Occasionally, 5=All the time) they would be negatively influenced in their decision on a 
grant application, or a paper if that application, or paper seemed to them to take a politically 
left/right-leaning perspective, how often they would be reluctant to invite a colleague to symposia 
who is known to be left/right-leaning, and how often they would be inclined to choose the more 
right/left-leaning job candidate of two equally qualified applicants in hiring.25 Using the same 																																																								
24 Participants were asked about their ‘colleagues in the field’. We didn’t specify the term further. But on a natural 
reading, it designates individuals with whom one is typically interacting when doing philosophy in academia, that is, 
one’s departmental co-workers, including faculty members but also fellow students, postdocs, etc. We acknowledge 
that it might not always be easy to average over one’s colleagues’ attitudes. 
25 Since there was no mentioning of the quality of, say, the argument supporting the perspective in the grant application 
or paper, or of the possibly poorer competence of the candidate, the answers to these questions reveal a readiness to 
discriminate that is based primarily on ideological preference. 
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questions and scales but with the context changed from self to others, we then also asked 
participants on their colleagues’ behavior with respect to these four issues. 
 
(4) Questions on justification 
 
Finally, participants were asked two justification-related questions: “How justified is discrimination 
(e.g., in hiring/promotion decisions, grants, or manuscript reviews) against left/right-leaning 
individuals in your field?” (1=Not at all justified, 3=Neither justified nor unjustified, 5=Extremely 
justified), and “How often should politically left/right-leaning ideas, theories, or critiques be 
discussed in the areas of philosophy where political viewpoints matter?” (1=Never, 
3=Occasionally/sometimes, 5=All the time). Our reasoning was that when participants hold that a 
left/right-leaning idea/theory/critique should, for instance, never be discussed then they take it to 
be justified that it is never discussed.  
 
In addition to the just mentioned four types of questions, we also left a ‘Free Response’ section at 
the end of the survey, asking participants whether there was anything else they wanted to add on 
what they had seen or personally experienced in their field with regard to their political beliefs. The 
free comments yielded qualitative data in addition to the quantitative evidence derived from the 
scales-set answers to questions belonging to (1)-(4).  
 
4. RESULTS (Quantitative data) 
 
4.1 Distribution of ideological viewpoints and results on (H1) 
 
As predicted with (H1), participants were primarily left-leaning (M=2.69, SD=1.49), t(793)= -
24.77, p<.001, 95% CI [2.56, 2.90] (see Table 2), analytic philosophers identifying as slightly less 
so (M=2.79, SD=1.50) than continental philosophers (M=2.47, SD=1.42), t(675)= -2.60, p=.01, 
95% CI [-.56, -.08] (see Table 4, Figure 3). Overall, 74.8% were left-leaning (20.2% ‘very left-
leaning’), while 14.2% were right-leaning (1.6% ‘very right-leaning’). Only 11% were moderates 
(for classification by rank and subfield, see Tables 3 and 5, Figures 2 and 4). On economic 
(M=2.55, SD=1.56) and social/ethical issues (M=2.77, SD=1.61) too, participants clearly leaned 
left (see Table 2). Participants also perceived their colleagues as primarily left-leaning (M=2.50, 
SD=.86), t(788)= -48.99, p<.001, 95% CI [-1.56, -1.44], and, as a post-hoc paired-samples t-test 
(not pre-registered) indicated, viewed them as more left-leaning than themselves (Mdiff=.193, 
SD=1.81), t(788)= 2.99, p<.001, 95% CI [.07, .32].26 
 
4.2 Ideological hostility and results on (H2) 
 																																																								
26 This is in line with other studies finding a “lone moderate effect”, which emerges when subjects view themselves as 
the only moderates in a controversy even within their own ideological group (see Keltner and Robinson 1993). 
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Supporting (H2), a significant correlation was found between ideology and reported personal 
experience of hostility r(794)=.47, p<.001 (see Table 6). The more right-leaning the participant, 
the more hostility they reported personally experiencing from colleagues, and, overall, the more 
left-leaning the participant, the less hostility they reported personally experiencing. Participants 
also perceived right-leaning individuals in the field (M=2.79, SD=.89) to experience more hostility 
than left-leaning subjects (M=1.78, SD=.64), t(779)= 24.40, p<.001, 95% CI [.93, 1.09] d=1.30. 
Looking at it another way, binning participants by ideology (binned: 1-3=left-leaning, 
4=moderate, 5-7=right-leaning), a post-hoc (not pre-registered) one-way ANOVA revealed 
significant differences in experiences of hostility by ideology, F(2, 793)= 151.09, p<.001. Post-hoc 
Bonferroni comparisons indicated that right-leaning participants reported experiencing more 
hostility than moderate participants (Mdiff=.78, p<.001) and left-leaning participants (Mdiff=1.50, 
p<.001), and that moderate participants reported experiencing more hostility than left-leaning 
participants (Mdiff=.72, p<.001).  
 
Turning now to ideological aversion against/preference for contents, participants reported that they 
would be more reluctant to defend their own argument if it led to a right-leaning conclusion 
(M=2.61, SD=1.16) than if it led to a left-leaning one (M=1.94, SD=1.02), t(647)=-
13.39, p<.001, 95% CI [-.78, -.58] d= -.61. There was also a weak tendency for more left-leaning 
participants to express more reluctance to defend a right-leaning conclusion  (r= -.09, p=.023) 
(Table 6). There was, however, no association between ideology and how often participants would 
be reluctant to defend their argument if it led to a left-leaning conclusion (r=.06, p=.126). These 
findings point toward an apparent stigma held by most participants, regardless of their political 
ideology, against defending right-leaning conclusions. Considered together with our other results, 
this reluctance to defend right-leaning conclusions may be the by-product of perceived or actual 
ideological discrimination within the field. It suggests the presence of ideological “self-censorship” 
(Bar Tal. 2017; Maroja 2019). 
 
4.3 WTD and results on (H3) 
 
As predicted with (H3), significant correlations were found between ideology and the WTD items 
(i.e., left/right-leaning on paper review, grant review, symposia invitation, hiring; Table 6). The 
more left-leaning the participant, the more frequently a right-leaning perspective/individual would 
be viewed negatively in assessing grant applications (r= -.37, p<.001), evaluating papers (r= -.31, 
p<.001), inviting colleagues to symposia (r= -.28, p<.001), and making hiring decisions involving 
two otherwise equally qualified candidates (r= -.36, p<.001). On the other side, the more right-
leaning the participant, the more frequently a left-leaning perspective/individual would be viewed 
negatively in assessing grant applications (r=.21, p<.001), evaluating papers (r=.15, p<.001), 
inviting colleagues to symposia (r=.08, p=.04), and making hiring decisions (r=.24, p<.001).  
 
But overall, WTD against right-leaning perspective/individuals (M=2.18, SD=.88) was 
significantly greater than WTD against left-leaning perspective/individuals (M=1.63, SD=.56), 
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t(732)= 16.11, p<.001, 95% CI [.48, .61] d=.74. To see this differently, consider the binned 
percentages (participants who responded “occasionally,” “frequently,” or “all the time”) for the 
WTD questions, broken out by ideology (binned: 1-3=left-leaning, 4=moderate, 5-7=right-
leaning; see Figure 5). 32% of the left-leaning participants indicated WTD against right-leaning 
papers, 42% against right-leaning grants, 38% against right-leaning symposia speakers, and 56% 
against right-leaning job candidates at least occasionally. In contrast, among right-leaning 
participants, 20% indicated WTD against left-leaning papers, 23% against left-leaning grants, 12% 
against left-leaning symposia, and 46% against a left-leaning job candidate at least occasionally (see 
Figure 5).  
 
Given the apparent skew in the percentages for WTD by ideology, via post-hoc analyses (not pre-
registered), we tested for left/right differences in frequency of WTD. Four new variables were 
created for WTD against the opposition (i.e., left vs. right and vice versa) for the four dimensions 
(reviewing a grant, assessing a paper, symposia invite, hiring). For ideology for these tests, we used 
the binned variable for ideology (1-3=left-leaning, 4=moderate, 5-7=right-leaning).27 Multiple 
independent samples t-tests to compare WTD against the opposition for left- vs. right-leaning 
participants showed that left-leaning participants (M=2.35, SD=.98) were more likely than right-
leaning ones (M=1.99, SD=.80) to view negatively the grant application of the opposing ideology, 
t(668)= 3.62, p<.001, 95% CI [.17, .56] d= .38. They (M=2.14, SD=.98) were also more likely 
than right-leaning participants (M=1.83, SD=.83) to view negatively a paper of the opposing 
ideology, t(669)= 3.04, p<.001, 95% CI [.11, .50] d= .32. Furthermore, they (M=2.25, 
SD=1.07) were more likely than right-leaning participants (M=1.55, SD=.79) to be less willing to 
invite colleagues of the opposing ideology to symposia, t(668)= 6.51, p<.001, 95% CI [.49, .91] 
d= .68. Last, left-leaning participants (M=2.67, SD=1.19) were more likely than right-leaning 
participants (M=2.37, SD=1.03) to not be willing to hire someone of the opposing ideology, 
t(668)= 2.45, p=.015, 95% CI [.06, .54] d= .26.28 Collectively, these analyses indicate that left-
leaning participants’ WTD against the right was greater than right-leaning participants’ WTD 
against the left (see Figures 5, 6 (for WTD by rank), and 7). 
 
Finally, there was no statistically significant difference between analytic (M=1.64, SD=.57) and 
continental (M=1.61, SD=.52) philosophers for WTD against left-leaning perspectives/colleagues, 
t(641)= -.50, p=.62, 95% CI [-.12, .07]. A statistically significant difference did emerge, however, 																																																								
27 For each variable, scores were merged such that, for example, the WTD against the opposition for hiring variable 
was comprised of the left’s scores for WTD against a right-leaning hire, and the right’s scores for WTD against a left-
leaning hire. The same was done for the other three variables. After creating the variables, a Hotelling’s Trace analysis 
was conducted, T2=3.63, F(4, 663)=601.63, p<.001, and indicated that the population means for the four variables 
were not equal, allowing us, therefore, to proceed with additional analyses. 
28 Chi-square analyses (recoding WTD for the four variables into dichotomous variables with <3=not WTD, 3-
5=WTD) corroborated these findings: Chi square tests of goodness of fit to determine whether WTD for left- and 
right-leaning participants was equivalent across the four dimensions (grant, paper, symposia, hiring) revealed that 
WTD for left- vs. right-leaning participants was not equivalent for grants, X2 (1, N=670)=33.58, p<.001, for papers, 
X2 (1, N=671)=103.08, p<.001, for symposia, X2 (1, N=670)=70.93, p<.001, or for hiring, X2 (1, N=670)=4.68, 
p=.031.	
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for WTD against right-leaning colleagues, t(638)= 2.89, p=.004, 95% CI [.07, .36]: continental 
philosophers (M=2.32, SD=.92) were willing to discriminate against right-leaning 
perspectives/colleagues more frequently than analytic philosophers (M=2.10, SD=.85). 
 
Moving from participants’ reports on how they themselves would act to their view on how they 
thought others would act, we found that the more left-leaning the participant, the more likely they 
were to believe that a left-leaning perspective/individual would be treated negatively by colleagues 
in the mentioned contexts (Table 6; grant application r= -.26, p<.001; paper review r= -.27, 
p<.001; symposia invitation r= -.31, p=.04; hiring decisions r= -.27, p<.001). And the more 
right-leaning the participant, the more likely they were to believe that a right-leaning 
perspective/individual would be viewed negatively by colleagues in these contexts (grant 
application r=.39, p<.001; paper review r=.36, p<.001; symposia invitation r=.31, p<.001; 
hiring decisions r=.34, p<.001). Overall, however, participants reported believing that colleagues 
would engage in discrimination against right-leaning individuals (M=2.74, SD=.87) more often 
than against left-leaning individuals (M=1.97, SD=.70), t(652)= 17.30, p<.001, 95% CI [.68, .85] 
d=.97.  
 
4.4 Justification of discrimination and results on (H4) 
 
398 participants (50.1%) indicated that discrimination against right-leaning contents/individuals in 
the field (in hiring/promotion decisions, grants, or manuscript reviews) is not at all justified (scale 
point 1 on the 1-5 scale). 436 (54.9%) indicated the same with respect to left-leaning 
contents/individuals. 365 participants (51.34%) indicated that both types of discrimination are not 
at all justified.  
 
Moreover, consistent with prediction (H4), there was a significant association between ideology 
and justification of discrimination against right-leaning individuals in the field (r = -.37, p<.001) 
(see Table 6). The more left-leaning the participant, the more justified they believed discrimination 
against right-leaning individuals to be. But, against (H4), there was no significant association 
between ideology and justification of discrimination against left-leaning individuals (r=.000, 
p=.991).  
 
Providing further insights into participants’ views on whether the treatment of certain ideological 
contents is justified, we also found that the more right-leaning the participant, the more frequent the 
indication that right-leaning ideas, theories, or critiques should be discussed more often in the 
relevant areas (r=.13, p=.001) (Table 6). But there was no significant association between ideology 
and opinions on how often left-leaning ideas, theories, or critiques should be discussed (r=-.07, 
p=.071). Notice too that while there was, overall, a significant difference between how often 
participants believed that left-leaning ideas, theories, or critiques should be discussed (when 
relevant) (M=4.02, SD=.62) compared to right-leaning ones (M=3.91, SD=.72), t(645)= 5.52, 
p<.001, 95% CI [.08, .16] d=.16), the means for both kinds of contents are quite high and near the 
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item scale-point of 4 (i.e., “frequently”). Practically speaking, overall, participants reported that 
both should be discussed (in the relevant areas) relatively frequently, and the effect size is small.  
 
5. RESULTS (Qualitative data) 
 
Turning now from the findings of the quantitative analyses, to the ‘Free Response’ that participants 
could give at the end of the survey, these responses provide qualitative data that help cast further 
light on the quantitative findings. For many free responses mention concrete examples of the 
ideological bias, discrimination, or hostility that respondents experienced, witnessed, or heard 
about. 231 participants (29.1% of the sample) left comments in the ‘Free Response’ section. We 
classified them into different, non-exclusive categories.29 Our four main categories were: 
 
(1) Underrepresentation of/hostility towards left-leaning individuals/views 
(2) Hostility from the left against the left  
(3) Underrepresentation of/hostility towards right-leaning individuals/views 
(4) Doubts about ideological bias/hostility/discrimination 
 
We’ll briefly consider some of the responses classified as (1)-(4). A list of all responses is freely 
available on our OSF platform.30  
 
5.1 Underrepresentation of/hostility towards left-leaning individuals/views  
 
28 responses fell into this category.31  Overall, people who were very left-leaning reported 
significantly more experiences of bias, discrimination, and hostility than liberals or moderately 
progressives, writing, for instance,  
 
In my experience the discrimination is against those *critical of liberalism* from a left-
wing/feminist/anti-colonial perspective. Liberal left-wing philosophers don’t have any 
difficulties – if anything, theirs is the dominant view. But anyone further left will experience 
a hostile environment (e.g. anarchists, Marxists). (68)32  
 
I do not think milquetoast liberal views are marginalized. I think more radical, broadly ‘left,’ 
communist, feminist, racial liberationist, etc. views are. (95; and see also 98, 137, 152, 172, 
175, 218, 223)  
 																																																								
29  Two of the authors independently classified the responses and afterwards crosschecked their classifications. 
30 See the Supplementary Data PHILOS-L Survey file at: 
https://osf.io/qd5fy/?view_only=aced37bbef6b44478c2f744920423187 
31 Since feminist views and environmental concerns and concerns about animal welfare are usually seen as part of a left-
leaning orientation, we included responses related to them in this group. 
32 The numbers in the brackets refer to the list of responses in the Supplementary Data PHILOS-L Survey file. 
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I had a grant application rejected in the last few years, and one of the reasons stated was that 
I am a feminist and a feminist cannot conduct a fair inquiry in the area of the grant 
application. (37) 
 
Some respondents maintained that “neoliberalism”, or the capitalist “system” itself contributes to an 
ideological bias against, and an underrepresentation of, radical left-wing views and individuals in 
academic philosophy (67, 51). Others suggested that hostility toward (radical) left-leaning views 
might in fact be internal or related to certain philosophical traditions:  
 
Analytic philosophy is built on a fairly right wing foundation anyway, of the individual logical 
man using atomised premises to create an argument. When one deviates from this, the 
boundaries of the discipline are heavily policed. (79; see also 137) 
 
The antipathy towards ‘continental’ philosophy also sometimes plays out in hostility towards 
left-wing political critique springing from that tradition. (175) 
    
5.2 Hostility from the left against the left  
 
Echoing some of the remarks just mentioned but more explicitly stating the source of hostility, one 
respondent wrote about the marginalization of certain left-leaning views by a “liberal majority” 
(95), while another added that the “discipline is politically liberal, which means hostile to both 
conservative and socialist critique” (172). Comments of this kind suggest that left-leaning 
individuals may be hostile to others on their own ideological side because they are too left. Adding 
further complexity to the phenomenon, people that self-identified as moderately left-leaning also 
sometimes reported that they faced hostility for being not left enough by those on the far left. In 
fact, 11 responses mentioned hostility against moderately left-leaning individuals or views from the 
far end of their own political side, saying, for instance:  
 
I for one did not feel comfortable voicing pro-Hillary sentiment during the primary, mainly 
for fear of censure from more left-leaning colleagues. (27) 
 
I said that I am left-leaning and sometimes feel pressure to stay quiet about my beliefs. […] I 
think this pressure is not coming from right-wing members of the profession, but from left-
wing members who might believe that I am not left-wing enough (170, see also 231, 12, 16 
99, 107, 52, 111, 115, 209)   
 
5.3 Underrepresentation of/hostility towards right-leaning individuals/views 
 
76 responses fell into this category, sometimes containing colorful expressions of experiences of 
hostility such as, for instance, 
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If my professional colleagues knew that I am moderately right-wing then half of them would 
call me a ‘subhuman pig’ and treat me accordingly. The other half would keep silent for fear 
of being next. (1) 
 
Several respondents also noted that right-leaning subjects were the preferred targets of jokes in 
academic philosophy:  
 
Comments and jokes about those on the right are frequent, and this makes it difficult to 
gauge the true balance of opinion as any right-leaning individual is likely to remain quiet. 
(210; see also 60 and 231).  
 
Another respondent wrote, 
 
I have seen large-scale organised walk-outs by students at visiting lectures by senior 
academics who are known to be politically right-leaning. […] [A] fairly large number of 
students and academics in philosophy tend to give the least charitable/most extreme 
interpretation of right-leaning claims made by others in their field. (182) 
 
Many left-leaning respondents were in fact open about their WTD against, for instance, far right-
leaning individuals and views, though they tended to suggest a different attitude toward moderately 
right-leaning ones and sometimes distinguished between right-leaning views on social as opposed to 
economic issues: 
 
I would not invite a far right speaker for a conference, but I don’t think this tells us anything 
about my inclinations to invite people from the center right. (73)   
 
I would loathe to hire a colleague who had views that had classist, racist, sexist, or nationalist 
implications, due to workplace issues. Economic views seem less directly relevant to the 
workplace environment. (132; see also 131, 23)  
 
Libertarian ideas about minimum wages and social welfare seem to be more tolerated than 
conservative arguments that challenge left-leaning views on social or ethical issues: 
 
I suspect that men and women are predisposed to have different interests, and that this 
accounts for the disparities in gender ratios across disciplines/professions. Yet this view is 
not one I am able to voice openly […]. I don’t know what reaction people would have if I 
were to make this view public, but I suspect it ‘hostile’ would be an understatement. (12)  
 
It is worth noting too that when right-leaning participants reported experiences of hostility in the 
free responses, there was no comment to the effect that the hostility was coming from individuals 
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from their own side of the political spectrum (either more radical or more moderate subjects). This 
contrasts with the free responses by left-leaning subjects about their left-leaning colleagues.  
 
5.4 Doubts about ideological bias/discrimination/hostility 
 
34 responses fell into this category. Some claimed that ideological bias and discrimination in 
philosophy are rare, if not non-existent,  
 
I have seen no evidence of systematic bias on the basis of political affiliation in 15 years of 
involvement in professional philosophy. (40; see also 180) 
 
My field (at least in Europe) is dominated by left-leaning individuals, such as myself. I don’t 
think this is the product of discrimination or anything sinister however. (179) 
 
In some responses, a subfield was taken to be free from discrimination because the decision makers 
lack knowledge of the ideology of the individuals they decide on (29) or ideology is irrelevant (122, 
200), and many respondents thought 
 
the quality of arguments matters more than the orientation of political beliefs. I feel that both 
right-wing and left-wing beliefs are respected in my field as long as they are well-supported. 
(91; see also 57, 86, 139, 162, 164, 226).  
 
Relatedly, a number of respondents claimed that right-wing ideas in general tend not to survive 
philosophical scrutiny,  
 
conservative ideas tend to lose in fair competition in the marketplace of ideas. They are given 
their chance, and are generally shown to be bad. People who accept many of them tend to be 
bad philosophers. (25; see also 85, 120) 
 
I’d be inclined to negatively review a right-leaning paper for the simple fact that I believe, 
given the arguments, that the political right get things *wrong*. We’re talking about matters 
of objective truth here. (85; see also 120) 
 
Neither the widespread endorsement of leftist positions nor the widespread rejection of 
conservative positions is a matter of ideological bias, any more so than there is a bias against 
Creationist among biologists. (146; see also 7, 103, 126, 128, 146, 149, 151, 203)  
 
While many philosophers claimed right-leaning views are in general, that is, not only the extreme 
positions, ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’ philosophy, we found no corresponding claim in the free responses with 
respect to left-leaning views. This was another significant difference in the free responses when left-
leaning participants’ comments were compared to those by right-leaning individuals.  
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6. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The qualitative and quantitative data introduced provide intriguing insights into the political 
dynamics in the field of philosophy. To begin with, participants in our survey clearly leaned left 
(74.8%; with 20.2% ‘very left-leaning’) while right-leaning subjects and moderates were 
minorities. This coheres with and extends research in other fields such as, for instance, sociology or 
social psychology that found a majority of liberals and an underrepresentation of conservatives in 
these disciplines (Yancey 2011; Inbar and Lammers 2012; Honeycutt and Freberg 2017). While the 
overall distribution of left- vs. right-leaning individuals that we found in philosophy might be 
expected, one of the more surprising results is that there were in fact fewer moderates (11%) in 
our sample than right-leaning individuals (14%). 
 
One factor contributing to the imbalance in representation of ideological viewpoints might be an 
aversion and discrimination against right-leaning and moderate individuals. Our study doesn’t 
directly show that they do contribute to it. It does, however, provide evidence that ideological 
hostility and a readiness to discriminate on the basis of ideology are not only real in philosophy but 
also directed at various ideologies, including a moderate stance (moderate participants reported 
experiencing more hostility than left-leaning participants, but less than right-leaning participants). 
Our findings thus suggest that across the political spectrum, from very left-leaning to very right-leaning 
individuals, philosophers sometimes experience politically motivated hostility in the field which, in 
some cases, prevents them from expressing their viewpoints, from being taken seriously, and from 
contributing to debates. This is striking, because given the pervasiveness of explicit commitments 
to open-mindedness, and inclusiveness among philosophers (Riggs 2010; Kidd 2017; Kings 2019), 
philosophy departments,33 and organizations,34 one would expect the opposite.  
 
Equally surprisingly, our qualitative data, combined with the quantitative findings, reveal a 
significant discrepancy between many philosophers’ beliefs that ideological bias and discrimination 
are either rare or non-existent in the field and many more other philosophers’ reports of having 
actually experienced or witnessed them first hand, or being willing to engage in it themselves. Starting 
with the political right, the more right-leaning the participant was, the more hostility they reported 
personally experiencing from colleagues, and the stronger their impression that they and their 
political ideology would be negatively viewed in judgment- and decision-making in the field. The 
validity of this subjective impression was partly confirmed by the fact that the more left-leaning the 
participant was, the more frequent their WTD against right-leaning individuals and contents in 
judgment- and decision-making. Similarly, while left-leaning participants didn’t report more 
experiences of hostility the more left-leaning they were, the more left-leaning the participant was, 
the stronger their impression that they themselves and their ideology would be negatively assessed 
in the mentioned contexts. This subjective impression too was partly confirmed by the fact that the 																																																								
33 See, e.g., the websites of the Department of Philosophy at NYU (http://as.nyu.edu/philosophy/climate.html) or 
Rutgers University (https://philosophy.rutgers.edu/about-us/discourse)  
34 https://www.apaonline.org/page/nondiscrimination 
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more right-leaning the participant was, the more frequent their WTD against left-leaning 
individuals or contents in application/paper reviewing, conference invitations, and hiring.  
 
These results provide support for the “ideological-conflict hypothesis” (Brandt et al. 2014) in 
suggesting that left-leaning individuals and right-leaning individuals are similarly intolerant against 
groups holding values inconsistent with their own. There were, however, also left-right 
asymmetries that are noteworthy in the context of the ideological-conflict hypothesis. For instance, 
right-leaning individuals’ WTD against left-leaning contents/individuals was less pronounced than 
left-leaning individuals’ WTD against right-leaning contents/individuals. Additionally, both groups 
of participants tended to be more reluctant to defend arguments with right-leaning conclusions than 
those with left-leaning ones – an interesting finding suggesting ideological self-censoring among 
participants (Bar Tal 2017; Maroja 2019). Moreover, while we found that within the left-leaning 
side of the political spectrum, factions are sometimes hostile against each other too, we couldn’t 
detect a similar phenomenon among right-leaning subjects. Since moderately left-leaning 
individuals (e.g., liberals) and very left-leaning individuals share important features (e.g., an 
emphasis on equality; Arneson 2015) that make them, despite their differences, fall on the same left 
side of the spectrum, we shall call this phenomenon intra-ideological hostility. In providing evidence 
of intra-ideological hostility, our study offers a new contribution to extant research on ideological 
hostility in academia, which has so far only revealed cross-ideological (liberals vs. conservatives and 
vice versa) hostility (Brandt et al. 2014; Honeycutt and Freberg 2017). It is an interesting question 
for future research whether intra-ideological hostility might in fact be stronger than cross-
ideological hostility. 
 
Independently of their strength, it is worth noting that hostility and discrimination against a 
particular ideology in philosophy or any other academic discipline needn’t be problematic. An 
aversion against creationists in biology or against flat-earthers in geology seems unobjectionable. 
The same might hold for individuals with certain ideologies in philosophy. If so, then one would 
expect members of the field to take discrimination against some subjects on the basis of their 
ideology to be justified. And indeed we did find that the more left-leaning the participant was, the 
more justified they believed discrimination against right-leaning contents/individuals in the field to 
be, while the reverse didn’t hold. Yet, importantly, we also found that about half of the participants 
took discrimination against either left- or right-leaning contents/individuals in the field to be not 
justified at all, which starkly contrasts with the fact that many participants on both the left and the 
right in fact openly acknowledged they would discriminate35 against contents/individuals of the 
opposite ideology.  																																																								
35 A reviewer notes that, for instance, subjects’ radically right-leaning beliefs may lead them to utterances about 
individuals (e.g., women, members of ethic minorities, etc.) that don’t just express the beliefs but also indirectly 
address the individuals concerned, where this interlocutory dimension of the expressions creates harm the envisaging of 
which may have driven the discriminatory responses in some of our participants. We agree that this interlocutory 
dimension of the expression of ideological beliefs is important to acknowledge and to further analyze to arrive at an 
adequate account of the justificatory basis of the discrimination we tracked.  
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Of course, even if the majority thought that acting in these ways isn’t justified, it might still be 
justified. We don’t want to commit to any strong view on whether this is the case with respect to 
individuals or contents of either ideology. That is, we are open to the possibility that ideological 
bias, hostility, and discrimination are frequently justified.36 We do, however, believe that they are 
also often costly enough for the field of philosophy to consider taking steps to counteract them.37 
There are two kinds of costs: epistemic costs and ethical ones. 
 
6.1 Epistemic costs 
 
These are negative effects on the reliability of belief formation and knowledge acquisition in the 
field. A bias against and lack of, say, feminist, moderate, or conservative (right-leaning) scholars in 
philosophy might be detrimental in this sense in that they reduce the scope of critical questions 
being asked, which increases researchers’ susceptibility to reasoning errors due to confirmation bias 
and group polarization, possibly impeding a convergence on truths (Longino 2002: 132; Draper 
and Nichols 2013; Peters 2019). The problem is particularly pressing in philosophy because 
philosophical claims are frequently affected by philosophers’ political values, which emphasize some 
aspects of an issue while obscuring others. And different ideological convictions incline 
philosophers toward different conclusions in debates on, for instance, equality (Cohen 2006: 416f), 
immigration (Hidalgo and Freiman 2016), social welfare (Rajczi 2014), abortion (McLachlan 
1977), implicit bias (Allen-Hermanson 2017b), affirmative action (Shield and Dunn 2016: 196f), 
the heritability of intelligence (Sesardic 2010), cognitive-difference research (Kourany 2016), 
values in science (Hicks 2011), and more. Since claims in these areas of philosophical inquiry are 
often based on political values and can’t be easily empirically tested, social criticism is important for 
philosophers to avoid blind spots and errors in their reasoning.  
 
A study by Gampa et al. (2019) suggests that these errors aren’t just possible but likely. Gampa et 
al. asked liberals and conservatives to evaluate the logical soundness of classically structured logical 
syllogisms supporting liberal or conservative beliefs, and found that both “liberals and conservatives 
frequently evaluated the logical structure of entire arguments based on the believability of 
arguments’ conclusions, leading to predictable patterns of logical errors. As a result, liberals were 
better at identifying flawed arguments supporting conservative beliefs and conservatives were 
better at identifying flawed arguments supporting liberal beliefs” (2019: 1). These findings highlight 
the importance of ideological opponents in value-laden debates, which are particularly common in 
philosophy, to correct for reasoning biases and possibly harness opposing individuals’ ideologies for 
epistemic group-level benefits (a ‘Mandevillian’ effect, Peters forthcoming).  
 
But a lack or swift dismissal of, for instance, very left-leaning, moderate, or right-leaning minority 
beliefs in philosophy wouldn’t only weaken the reliability of philosophical belief formation. It could 																																																								
36 Thanks here to James Robert Brown for prompting us to be more specific about our claims. See also footnote 7. 
37 For a more detailed argument for this view, see Peters (2019: 403f).	
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also lead scholars to overlook meaningful research questions (Richardson 2010; Jussim et al. 2018), 
and might, given the reduced social checking of reasoning, cause scholars inside and outside 
philosophy as well as the public to distrust philosophical research (Rolin 2002: 100f; Kornblith 
1999: 190f). 
 
Some ‘Free Responses’ suggested that an aversion and discrimination against right-leaning 
individuals and views, in particular, is in fact epistemically warranted because such individuals are 
less likely to reason correctly, and their views tend to be misguided. However, any claim to the 
effect that right-leaning individuals are in general less intelligent and philosophically capable than 
left-leaning subjects is most likely false due to its broad scope and the diverse distribution of 
intellectual capacities (Duarte et al. 2015: 9). Moreover, even advocates of misguided minority 
views might be epistemically beneficial in challenging and/or motivating those holding the accurate 
views to articulate and keep in sight the reasons for their views (Longino 2002: 131f). An absence of 
and/or discrimination against misguided minority positions increase the probability that subjects 
come to hold widely shared correct views without being able to properly defend them (Maroja 
2019).  
 
6.2 Ethical costs  
 
These are effects of ideological bias and a lack of ideological diversity related to a violation of what 
subjects take to be morally valuable such as, for instance, fairness, equality, or social justice. The 
ideological hostility and discrimination we found create ethical costs in violating moral principles 
that many philosophers (e.g., Riggs 2010; Kidd 2017; Kings 2019) and philosophical institutions 
commit themselves to. For example, in Europe, the “Faculty of Philosophy” at Cambridge 
University stresses that it is “committed to equality, diversity, and inclusion”.38 Oxford University 
too has a “commitment to fostering an inclusive culture which promotes equality, values diversity 
and maintains a working, learning and social environment in which the rights and dignity of all its 
staff and students are respected.”39 Turning to the US, the Department of Philosophy at New York 
University emphasizes: “We do not tolerate […] discrimination, and we strongly support efforts to 
remove barriers to inclusiveness in philosophy as a discipline.”40 In the same vein, the Department 
of Philosophy at Rutgers University writes: “Philosophy both requires and fosters norms of civil, 
inclusive discourse. […] No topic or claim is too obvious or controversial to be discussed.”41 
Similarly, the American Philosophical Association “acknowledges that in all their professional 
interactions and relations, philosophers are responsible for: Treating others fairly, equitably, and 
																																																								
38 https://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/prosp-students/copy2_of_GraduateProspectus1920_FINAL.pdf/at_download/file 
39 https://edu.admin.ox.ac.uk/home 
40 http://as.nyu.edu/philosophy/climate.html 
41 https://philosophy.rutgers.edu/about-us/discourse 
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with dignity” and “[r]especting the philosophical opinions and traditions of others, without 
disparaging those who hold positions at odds with one’s own”.42  
 
It may be untenable to hold that ‘all are welcome’, because, as Popper (1945) suggests, if “we are 
not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant 
will be destroyed, and tolerance with them” (360). But many political philosophers have 
convincingly argued that it is usually morally and politically wise to ‘tolerate the intolerant’ as long 
as nobody’s safety is in danger (Rawls 1971; Walzer 1997). And while it isn’t always easy to draw 
the lines between what is a dangerous ideological view and what isn’t (Simpson and Srinivasan 
2018: 191f), it seems reasonable to assume that most left-leaning and right-leaning philosophers 
aren’t putting people’s safety at risk.   
 
7. LIMITATIONS 
 
(1) Low response rate. When the survey was sent out via the PHILOS-L list server, the server had 
11,388 subscribers. Initial response rate was 9.39%. After data exclusions, the final response rate 
was 6.97%. This is low43 and introduces the risk that the people who didn’t respond display 
characteristics that are different to those of the people who did.  
 
However, low response rates in online surveys are common, and several studies found in fact no 
direct correlation between response rate and validity (Visser et al. 1996). Recent evaluations of 
surveys with response rates ranging from 5% to 54% concluded that studies with a lower response 
were frequently only marginally less accurate than those with much higher rates (Holbrook et al. 
2007). So a low response rate doesn’t automatically mean the study results have low validity, 
especially not when the absolute numbers are high, as in our case (Templeton et al. 1997). 
Moreover, when respondent characteristics are representative of those of non-respondents, low 
response rates aren’t problematic at all (Sax et al. 2003). We can’t verify whether respondent 
characteristics in our sample were representative of the field of philosophy as a whole. But our 
sample is similar to samples of related studies. Our participants, just as those of these other studies, 
were mostly male, white, liberal/left, and analytic philosophers44 (Paxton et al. 2012; Botts et al. 
2014; Yancey 2011; Bourget and Chalmers 2014), suggesting that our sample isn’t especially 
unrepresentative of the field. The generalizability and validity of our results is also supported by the 
fact that key trends in our data (e.g., an underrepresentation of right-leaning subjects, hostility 
against them but also against, e.g., feminists) aren’t outliers but consistent with those from related 																																																								
42 https://www.apaonline.org/page/codeofconduct; see also the American Philosophical Association “rejects as unethical 
all forms of discrimination based on […] political convictions”: https://www.apaonline.org/page/nondiscrimination. 
43 The low response rate might have been due to the fact that the survey was sent out in June-July (2018), which is 
when many faculty are occupied with end-of-term activities, marking etc. Notice too that many subscribers to 
PHILOS-L are administrative staff and as such won’t respond to surveys of the kind at issue.  
44 While our sample consisted of 43,2% students and 49.7% faculty members, even if most participants had been 
students, our findings would still be valuable in revealing insights into the ideological climate for students in the field.  
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surveys of the field (e.g., Yancey 2011; Weinberg 2016; Honeycutt and Freberg 2017) and 
personal reports by philosophers (see Section 1). 
 
(2) Lack of gradients. When assessing participants’ WTD against left/right-leaning individuals and 
viewpoints, we didn’t provide the three gradients ‘somewhat left/right-leaning’, ‘left/right-
leaning’, and ‘very left/right-leaning’, but only used ‘left/right-leaning’. This is a limitation 
because the responses don’t allow us to tell whether participants would act differently toward 
‘somewhat’ and ‘very left/right-leaning’ individuals, and it might be that some interpreted our 
questions as referring to ‘very’ left/right-leaning individuals whereas others took them to refer 
only to ‘somewhat’ left/right-leaning individuals.  
 
However, in the relevant place in the survey, we did remind participants that the questions at issue 
referred to the middle position of each ideology only. Moreover, even if some participants 
interpreted them as referring to extreme positions when others interpreted them as referring to 
moderate ones, our results are still interesting. For in the absence of any ideological bias, each 
participant should apply the same (extreme or moderate) reading of the gradients to both left-
leaning and right-leaning individuals alike, treating them both equally negatively/positively. But 
this isn’t what we found.  
 
(3) Ambiguous concepts. Another criticism of the survey might be that the terms (politically) ‘left’ and 
‘right’ are too vague, and their meanings differ internationally too much, making the 
informativeness of the survey results doubtful. If the origin point of the moderate position varies 
across individuals or groups, etc., the responses won’t be commensurable.  
 
We grant that the relative vagueness of ‘left’ and ‘right’ is a limitation of our survey. But the results 
remain informative and important, because as we noted earlier (section 2.1), there is a significant 
overlap in the meaning of the terms internationally, which has been independently confirmed by 
empirical research in political psychology (Noel and Therien 2008; Caprara and Vecchione 2018). 
This overlap ensures that the results are informative even if not every respondent interprets the 
intervals we used in exactly the same way.45 The informative value is further supported by the 
overall coherence of our key results with the results of related studies using the Democrat vs. 
Republican or liberal vs. conservative distinctions (Yancey 2011; Honeycutt and Freberg 2017). 
More generally, while a detailed investigation of the regional differences in ideological leanings and 
biases, and of philosophers’ views on specific policy issues would be an interesting complement to 
our study, the phenomenon of ideological diversity is, just as ideology itself, a multi-
dimensional phenomenon that is usefully explored by pursuing a variety of methods, including the 
																																																								
45 The referents of political ‘left’ and ‘right’ that participants in international surveys are likely to have in mind might be 
construed as Wittengsteinian “family resemblance” concepts; see Cochrane (2015) for a development of this idea, 
which is congenial to our view here. 
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approach we adopted here that deploys a standard tool from the political sciences (i.e., the 
left/right spectrum; Caprara and Vecchione 2018).46   
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
The survey we conducted suggests that the field of philosophy is heavily ideologically skewed 
toward the left, and both right-leaning individuals and moderates are underrepresented. The data 
we gathered also suggest that across the political spectrum, participants sometimes experience 
ideological bias and hostility in the field, occasionally coming from their own side of the political 
spectrum. In fact, a significant minority in the survey exhibited an explicit willingness to 
discriminate against individuals with the opposite ideology, while about half of the participants 
indicated that discrimination against left- or right-leaning individuals is not justified. These findings 
add new insights to the social psychological research on ideology, and have implications for 
philosophers interested in meta-philosophical, ethical, and epistemological questions. For they 
pertain to the issue as to whether judgment- and decision-making in philosophy is as reliable and 
morally responsible as it should be. The specific distribution of and bias and hostility against 
political viewpoints that we found cast doubts on the view that it is, because these ideology-related 
factors undermine social criticism, and are at odds with tolerance and open dialogue. It thus seems 
to us that the results of the study provide reasons for concern no matter where one stands on the 
political spectrum.  
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APPENDIX: TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1: Geographic region of participants 
Region Count Percent 
Europe 533 67.13% 
North America 175 22.04% 
Middle East 22 2.77% 
Australia/New Zealand 20 2.52% 
South America 10 1.26% 
East Asia 9 1.13% 
Africa 5 0.63% 
No Response 20 2.52% 
 
 
Table 2: Ideology of participants 
 Overall, count 
(percent) 
Social/ethical 
issues, count 
(percent) 
Economic issues, 
count (percent) 
Very left-leaning 160 (20.2%) 210 (26.5%) 170 (21.4%) 
Left-leaning 309 (38.9%) 305 (38.5%) 289 (36.4%) 
Somewhat left-leaning 125 (15.7%) 105 (13.2%) 118 (14.9%) 
Moderate 87 (11.0%) 60 (7.6%) 75 (9.5%) 
Somewhat right-
leaning 
59 (7.4%) 55 (6.9%) 69 (8.7%) 
Right-leaning 41 (5.2%) 37 (4.7%) 53 (6.7%) 
Very right-leaning 13 (1.6%) 21 (2.6%) 19 (2.4%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Overall ideology of participants by rank 
  
Full 
professor 
Associate 
professor 
Assistant 
professor 
Assistant lecturer/ 
teaching assistant 
Post-doctoral 
researcher Graduate student Undergraduate student Other 
Very left-
leaning 15 (21.4%) 11 (15.9%) 24 (27.6%) 16 (30.2%) 23 (20.2%) 60 (20%) 5 (12.2%) 5 (9.1%) 
Left-
leaning 24 (34.3%) 30 (43.5%) 38 (43.7%) 22 (41.5%) 49 (43%) 121 (40.3%) 11 (26.8%) 14 (25.5%) 
Somewhat 
left-leaning 12 (17.1%) 13 (18.8%) 5 (5.7%) 6 (11.3%) 24 (21.1%) 44 (14.7%) 8 (19.5%) 12 (21.8%) 
Moderate 11 (15.7%) 3 (4.3%) 9 (10.3%) 4 (7.5%) 8 (7%) 33 (11%) 7 (17.1%) 12 (21.8%) 
Somewhat 
right-
leaning 4 (5.7%) 8 (11.6%) 6 (6.9%) 2 (3.8%) 5 (4.4%) 25 (8.3%) 4 (9.8%) 4 (7.3%) 
Right-
leaning 3 (4.3%) 4 (5.8%) 4 (4.6%) 3 (5.7%) 5 (4.4%) 11 (3.7%) 3 (7.3%) 6 (10.9%) 
Very right-
leaning 1 (1.4%) 0 (0%) 1 (1.1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 6 (2%) 3 (7.3%) 2 (3.6%) 
Figure 2. Percentages of participants by rank and ideology 
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Table 4: Overall ideology of participants by tradition 
  Continental philosophy Analytic philosophy Other 
Very left-leaning 53 (24.2%) 74 (16.2%) 31 (29.2%) 
Left-leaning 91 (41.6%) 189 (41.3%) 27 (25.5%) 
Somewhat left-leaning 33 (15.1%) 69 (15.1%) 20 (18.9%) 
Moderate 18 (8.2%) 51 (11.1%) 18 (17%) 
Somewhat right-leaning 10 (4.6%) 44 (9.6%) 3 (2.8%) 
Right-leaning 12 (5.5%) 22 (4.8%) 6 (5.7%) 
    
Very right-leaning 2 (0.9%) 9 (2%) 1 (0.9%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentages of participants by tradition and ideology 
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Table 5: Overall ideology of participants by area 
  Epistemology Ethics 
History of 
philosophy Logic Metaphysics 
Philosophy of 
mind 
Philosophy of 
religion 
Philosophy of 
science 
Political 
philosophy 
Very left-
leaning 27 (16.8%) 58 (20.7%) 36 (21.2%) 4 (7.3%) 28 (20%) 23 (16.5%) 5 (8.2%) 31 (18%) 77 (26.3%) 
Left-leaning 65 (40.4%) 107 (38.2%) 65 (38.2%) 14 (25.5%) 50 (35.7%) 57 (41%) 12 (19.7%) 74 (43%) 114 (38.9%) 
Somewhat 
left-leaning 27 (16.8%) 52 (18.6%) 20 (11.8%) 11 (20%) 24 (17.1%) 20 (14.4%) 11 (18%) 32 (18.6%) 44 (15%) 
Moderate 16 (9.9%) 24 (8.6%) 26 (15.3%) 9 (16.4%) 21 (15%) 19 (13.7%) 8 (13.1%) 16 (9.3%) 28 (9.6%) 
Somewhat 
right-leaning 13 (8.1%) 18 (6.4%) 10 (5.9%) 8 (14.5%) 10 (7.1%) 14 (10.1%) 10 (16.4%) 8 (4.7%) 14 (4.8%) 
Right-leaning 10 (6.2%) 14 (5%) 11 (6.5%) 6 (10.9%) 7 (5%) 6 (4.3%) 11 (18%) 8 (4.7%) 8 (2.7%) 
Very right-
leaning 3 (1.9%) 7 (2.5%) 2 (1.2%) 3 (5.5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (6.6%) 3 (1.7%) 8 (2.7%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentages of participants by area and ideology 
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	Table 6: Correlations of ideology with variables and items, and variable and item means (sds) 
 Political 
ideology 
M (sd) 
Political ideology — 2.69 (1.49) 
Hostility (personal) composite variable .47*** 2.21 (1.02) 
WTD Right-leaning paper -.31*** 1.99 (.95) 
WTD Right-leaning grant -.37*** 2.18 (.98) 
WTD Right-leaning symposia guest -.28*** 2.10 (1.08) 
WTD Right-leaning hire -.36*** 2.44 (1.20) 
WTD Left-leaning paper .15*** 1.60 (.73) 
WTD Left-leaning grant .21*** 1.68 (.73) 
WTD Left-leaning symposia guest .08* 1.42 (.64) 
WTD Left-leaning hire .39*** 1.85 (.89) 
Colleagues WTD Right-leaning paper .36*** 2.62 (.96) 
Colleagues WTD Right-leaning grant .39*** 2.73 (.94) 
Colleagues WTD Right-leaning symposia guest .31*** 2.73 (.99) 
Colleagues WTD Right-leaning hire .34*** 2.89 (.99) 
Colleagues WTD Left-leaning paper -.27*** 1.95 (.79) 
Colleagues WTD Left-leaning grant -.26*** 2.01 (.81) 
Colleagues WTD Left-leaning symposia guest -.31*** 1.88 (.82) 
Colleagues WTD Left-leaning hire -.27*** 2.08 (.83) 
Justified discrimination—right-leaning individual -.37*** 1.90 (1.21) 
Justified discrimination--left-leaning individual .000 1.64 (.95) 
Fit—right-leaning individual -.05 2.65 (.85) 
Fit—left-leaning individual .05 3.67 (.81) 
How often should right-leaning ideas, theories, critiques be 
discussed 
.13** 3.91 (.72) 
How often should left-leaning ideas, theories, critiques be 
discussed 
-.07 4.02 (.61) 
Defend right-leaning conclusion to argument -.09* 2.61 (1.16) 
Defend left-leaning conclusion to argument .06 1.94 (1.02) 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Figure 5. Percentages of participants answering 3-5 on the “willingness to discriminate” items 
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Figure 6. Percentages of participants by rank answering 3-5 on the “willingness to discriminate” items 
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Figure 7. Percentage of participants (overall) answering 3-5 on the “willingness to 
discriminate” items 
 
	
32.38%	(182)	
8.77%	(49)	
41.81%	(235)	
9.82%	(55)	
37.97%	(213)	
4.47%	(25)	
55.79%	(313)	
17.45%	(97)	14.81%	(12)	 13.58%	(11)	
18.52%	(15)	
12.35%	(10)	
23.46%	(19)	
		3.70%	(3)	
27.16%	(22)	 28.40%	(23)	
6.54%	(7)	
20.18%	(22)	
10.28%	(11)	
23.15%	(25)	
16.82%	(18)	
11.93%	(13)	
16.82%	(18)	
45.87%	(50)	
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
Left-leaning Moderate Right-leaning 
Right-leaning  
paper 
Left-leaning  
paper 
Right-leaning  
grant 
Left-leaning  
grant 
Right-leaning  
symposia 
Left-leaning 
symposia 
Right-leaning  
hire 
Left-leaning  
hire 
Notes: Scores of 3 mean "occasionally" and scores of 5 mean "all the time";  
bubble area corresponds to the number of participants answering 3, 4, or 5 for each item. 
References 
Allen-Hermanson, S. (2017a). Leaky pipeline myths: In search of gender effects on the job 
market and early career publishing in philosophy. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 953, 1–10. 
Allen-Hermanson, S. (2017b). Implicit bias, stereotype threat, and political correctness in 
philosophy. Philosophies, 2(2), 12. https://doi. org/10.3390/philosophies2020012 
 
Antony, L. (2016). Bias: friend or foe? Reflections of Saulish skepticism. In: Brownstein, M., 
and Saul, J.  (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford: 
OUP, pp. 157-190. 
 
Arneson, R. (2015). Liberalism and Equality. In: Wall, S. (ed.), Cambridge Companion to 
Liberalism. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 212-236. 
 
Bar Tal, D. (2017). Self-Censorship as a socio-political-psychological phenomenon: Conception 
and research. Political Psychology, 38, S1, 37-65 
 
Bobbio, N. (1996). Left and right: The significance of a political distinction. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Botts, T., Bright, L., Cherry, M., Mallarangeng, G., & Spencer, Q. (2014). What Is the State 
of Blacks in Philosophy? Critical Philosophy of Race, 2, 2: 224-242. Project MUSE, 
muse.jhu.edu/article/552772. 
 
Bourget, D., and Chalmers, D. (2014). What Do Philosophers Believe? Philosophical Studies, 
170: 465-500. 
 
Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T. & Wetherell, G. (2014). The 
ideological-conflict hypothesis: Intolerance among both liberals and conservatives. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science 23(1): 27–34. 
 
Brownstein, M. & Saul, J. (2016). Implicit Bias and Philosophy. Oxford: OUP. 
 
Carl, N. (2015). Does intelligence have a U-shaped relationship with leftism? Intelligence, 49, 
159-170.  
 
Caprara, G. V., & Vecchione, M. (2018). On the left and right ideological divide: Historical 
accounts and contemporary perspectives. Political Psychology, 39, 49–83. 
 
Case, S. (2015). Political Bias in Philosophy and Why it Matters. National Association of Scholars. 
URL: https://www.nas.org/articles/political_bias_in_philosophy_and_why_it_matters 
 
Cochrane, C. (2015). Left and Right: The Small World of Political Ideas. Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press. 
 
Cohen, G.A. (2006). Are freedom and equality compatible? In: Goodin, R., and Pettit, P. 
(eds.), Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Blackwell Publishing, pp. 416-425. 
 
Crawford, J. T., Brandt, M. J., Inbar, Y., Chambers, J. R., & Motyl, M. (2017). Social and 
economic ideologies differentially predict prejudice across the political spectrum, but social 
issues are most divisive. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 112, 383-412. 
 
Draper, P., & Nichols, R. (2013). Diagnosing bias in philosophy of religion. The Monist, 96: 
420–446. 
 
Duarte J., Crawford J., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & Tetlock P. (2015). Political diversity 
will improve social psychological science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38: 1–13. 
 
Erikson, R., & Tedin, K. (2003). American public opinion. NY: Longman. 
 
Fantl, J. (2018). The Limitations of the Open Mind. Oxford: OUP.  
 
Gampa, A., Wojcik, S., Motyl, M., Nosek, B. A., and Ditto, P. (2019). (Ideo)logical 
reasoning: ideology impairs sound reasoning. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 1-9 DOI: 
10.1177/1948550619829059  
 
Goldfarb, M. (2010). Liberal? Are we talking about the same thing? BBC News. URL: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-10658070 
 
Gross, N. (2013). Why are professors liberal and why do conservatives care? Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Haidt, J. (2011). The bright future of post-partisan social psychology. Talk given at the Annual 
Meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, San Antonio, TX, January 27, 2011. 
Transcript available at: http://people.stern.nyu. edu/jhaidt/postpartisan.html 
 
Haslanger, S. (2008). Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason 
(Alone). Hypatia 23 (2): 210–23. 
 
Heywood, A. (2015). Key Concepts in Politics and International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Hicks, D. (2011). Is Longino’s conception of objectivity feminist? Hypatia 26 (2): 333–51. 
 
Hidalgo, J., and Freiman, C. (2016). Liberalism or Immigration Restrictions, But Not Both. 
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (2): 1–22. 
 
Holbrook A., Krosnick J., & Pfent A. (2007). The causes and consequences of response rates in 
surveys by the news media and government contractor survey research firms. In: Lepkowski 
JM, Tucker NC, Brick JM, De Leeuw ED, Japec L, Lavrakas PJ, et al, editors. Advances in 
Telephone Survey Methodology. New York (NY): Wiley; 2007. 
 
Honeycutt, N., & Freberg, L. (2017). The Liberal and Conservative Experience Across 
Academic Disciplines. Social Psychological and Personality Science 8 (2): 115–123. 
 
Inbar, Y., & Lammers, J. (2012). Political diversity in social and personality psychology. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science 7 (5): 496–503. 
 
Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on 
group polarisation. American Journal of Political Science, 59: 690–707. 
 
Iyengar, S. and Massey, D.S. (2019). Scientific communication in a post-truth society. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116, 16, 7656-7661. 
 
Jost, J., Federico, C., & Napier, J. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and 
elective affinities. Annual Review of Psychology 60: 307–37.  
 
Jussim L., Crawford J., Anglin S., & Stevens, S. (2015). Ideological bias in social psychological 
research. In: Forgas, P., Fiedler, K., Crano, W. (eds.), Social Psychology and Politics. NY: Taylor 
and Francis, pp. 91–109. 
 
Jussim, L., Stevens, S. T., & Honeycutt, N. (2018). Unasked questions about stereotype 
accuracy. Archives of Scientific Psychology, 6(1), 214-229. 
 
Keltner, D., & Robinson, R. J. (1993). Imagined ideological differences in conflict escalation 
and resolution. International Journal of Conflict Management. 4, 249-262. 
Kidd, I.J. (2017). Resisters, Diversity in Philosophy, and the Demographic Problem. Rivista di 
Estetica, 64, 118–134.  
Kings, A.M. (2019).Philosophy’s Diversity Problem. Metaphilosophy, 50 (3): 212-230. 
 
Klein, D., & Stern, C. (2009). By the numbers: The ideological profile of professors. In: 
Maranto, R., Redding, R., and Hess, F. (eds.), The politically correct university: Problems, scope, 
and reforms, AEI Press, pp. 15–38. 
 
Knobe, J., and Nichols, S. (2017). Experimental Philosophy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/experimental-philosophy/>. 
 
Kornblith, H. (1999). Distrusting reason. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23: 181-196. 
 
Kourany, J. (2016). Should some knowledge be forbidden? The case of cognitive differences 
research. Philosophy of Science, 83 (5): 779–790. 
 
Longino, H. (2002). Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Lukes, S. (2003). Epilogue: The grand dichotomy of the twentieth century. In: Ball, T., and 
Bellamy, R. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 602-626. 
 
Maher, P. J., Igou, E. R., & van Tilburg, W. A. P. (2018). Brexit, Trump, and the Polarizing 
Effect of Disillusionment. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 9(2), 205–213. 
 
Mair, P. (2009). Left–Right Orientations. In: Dalton, R.J. and Klingemann, H.D. (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior. Oxford: OUP. 
 
Maroja, L. (2019). Self-Censorship on Campus Is Bad for Science. The Atlantic. URL: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/self-censorship-campus-bad-
science/589969/ 
 
Mason, L. (2018). Ideologues without issues: the polarizing consequences of ideological 
identities. Publ. Opin. Q., 82, 280-301. 
 
McLachlan, H. (1977). Must We Accept Either the Conservative or the Liberal View on 
Abortion? Analysis 37 (4): 197–204. 
 
McMahan, J. (2019). I was no-platformed. Here’s why it’s counterproductive. NewStatesman. 
URL: https://www.newstatesman.com/2019/01/i-was-no-platformed-here-s-why-it-s-
counterproductive 
 
Morton  S.,  Bandara  D.,  & Robinson  E., (2012). In the 21st century, what is an acceptable 
response rate? Aust N Z J Public Health, 36: 106, 8. doi:10.1111/j.1753-6405.2012.00854.x 
 
Noel, A. and Therien, J. (2008), Left and Right in Global Politics. Cambridge: CUP. 
 
Paxton, M., Figdor, C., and Tiberius, V. (2012). Quantifying the gender gap: An empirical 
study of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. Hypatia, 27 (4): 949–957. 
 
Peters, U. (2019). Implicit bias, Ideological Bias, and Epistemic Risks in Philosophy. Mind & 
Language, 34, 393–419 
 
Peters, U. (forthcoming). Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition 
in Science. British Journal for Philosophy of Science.  
 
Popper, K. (1945). The Open Society and Its Enemies. Routledge. 
 
Priest, G. (2006). What is philosophy? Philosophy 81 (2): 189–207. 
 
Rajczi, A. (2014). What Is the Conservative Point of View about Distributive Justice? Public 
Affairs Quarterly, 28(4): 341–373. 
 
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Redding, R. (2001). Sociopolitical diversity in psychology: The case for pluralism. American 
Psychologist, 56, 205–217. 
 
Richardson, R. (1984). Biology and Ideology: The Interpenetration of Science and Values. 
Philosophy of Science 51: 396-420. 
 
Richardson, S. (2010). Feminist Philosophy of Science: History, Contributions and Challenges. 
Synthese 177:337–62. 
 
Riggs, W. (2010). Open-mindedness. Metaphilosophy, 41(1/2), 172–188. 
Rockey, J. (2014). Who is left-wing and who just thinks they are? University of Leicester Working 
Paper No. 09/23. URL: https://www.le.ac.uk/ec/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp09-23.pdf 
Rolin, K. (2002). Gender and Trust in Science. Hypatia 17 (4): 95–118. 
 
Rosas, J., and Ferreira, A. (2013). Left and Right: The Great Dichotomy Revisited. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
 
Rothman, S., Lichter, S., & Nevitte, N. (2005) Politics and professional advancement. Academic 
Questions 18(2): 71–84. 
 
Rothman, S., & Lichter, R. (2009). The vanishing conservative: Is there a glass ceiling? In: 
Maranto, R., Redding, R., and Hess, F. (eds.), The politically correct university: Problems, scope, 
and reforms, AEI Press, pp. 60–76. 
 
Saul, J. (2013). Skepticism and implicit bias. Disputatio  5 (37): 243–63. 
 
Saul, J. (2015). Let’s discuss rejections of feminist philosophy. Feminist Philosophers. URL: 
https://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/?s=ideological+bias 
 
Saul, J. (2017). Racial Figleaves, the Shifting Boundaries of the Permissible, and the Rise of 
Donald Trump. Philosophical Topics, 45(2), 97–116. 
 
Sax, L., Gilmartin, S., & Bryant, A. (2003). Assessing Response Rates and Nonresponse 
Bias in Web and Paper Surveys. Research in Higher Education, 44, 4: 409-432. 
 
Schwitzgebel, E. (2008). Political Affiliations of American Philosophers, Political Scientists, 
and Other Academics. The Splintered Mind. URL: 
 http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.be/2008/06/political-affiliations-of-american.html 
 
Schwitzgebel, E., & Ellis, J. (2017). Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical Thought. In: 
Bonnefon, J.F., and Trémolière, B. (eds.), Moral Inferences, New York: Routledge, pp. 170-
182. 
 
Schwitzgebel, E. & Hassoun, N. (2018). Tell Us How to Fix the Lack of Diversity in 
Philosophy Journals. Blog of the APA. URL https://blog.apaonline.org/2018/03/26/tell-us-
how-to-fix-the-lack-of-diversity-in-philosophy-journals/ 
 
Scruton, R. (2014). How to be conservative. Bloomsbury Continuum. 
 
Sesardic, N. (2010). Nature, nurture, and politics. Biology & Philosophy, 25(3), 433–436. 
 
Sesardic, N. (2016). When Reason Goes on Holiday: Philosophers in Politics. Encounter. 
 
Shields, J., & Dunn, J. (2016). Passing on the Right: Conservative Professors in the Progressive 
University. NY: OUP.  
 
Simpson, R., and Srinivasan, A. (2018). No-platforming. In Academic Freedom, (ed.) Jennifer 
Lackey. Oxford: OUP.   
 
Skitka, L. J. (2012). Multifaceted problems: Liberal bias and the need for scientific rigor in self-
critical research. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 508–511. 
doi:10.1177/1745691612454135 
 
Stanley, J. (2015). How Propaganda works. Princeton University Press 
 
Stevens, S. T., Jussim, L., Anglin, S. M., & Honeycutt, N. (2018). Direct and indirect 
influences of political ideology on perceptions of scientific findings. In B. T. Rutjens & M. J. 
Brandt (Eds.), Belief systems and perceptions of reality (pp. 108–124). New York: Routledge. 
 
Templeton, L. et al. (1997). Surveying general practitioners: does a low response rate matter? 
British Journal of General Practice, 47: 91–4. 
 
Visser P., Krosnick J., Marquette J., Curtin M. (1996). Mail surveys for election forecasting? 
An evaluation of the Colombia Dispatch Poll. Public Opin Q., 60:181-227. 
 
Walzer, M. (1997). On Toleration. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Weinberg, J. (2016). Which ideas are students protected from? Which are faculty fearful to 
defend? Daily Nous. Retrieved from http://dailynous.com/2016/08/30/ideas-
studentsprotected-from-faculty-fearful-to-defend/ 
 
Westwood, J. S., Iyengar, S., Walgrave, S., Leonisio, R. Miller, & L. Strijbis O. (2018). The 
tie that divides: cross-national evidence of the primacy of partyism. Eur. J. Political Res., 57 (2), 
333-354. 
 
Yancey, G. (2011). Compromising Scholarship: Religious and Political Bias in American Higher 
Education. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press. 
 	
